Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare Family of Concepts

With its tenets embedded in Naval Power 21, Marine Corps Strategy 21, and Sea Power 21, Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare (EMW) is the capstone concept that guides how the Marine Corps will organize, deploy, employ, and sustain its forces today and in the future. Capitalizing on the Marine Corps' philosophy of maneuver warfare and its expeditionary heritage, EMW emphasizes strategically agile and tactically flexible Marine Air-Ground Task Forces (MAGTF) with the operational reach to project power directly against critical points in the littorals and beyond. EMW integrates our operational, functional, and enabling concepts, and it describes the relationship between them.

EMW prepares the Marine Corps to move beyond traditional "amphibious operations," in the narrow sense, toward "expeditionary warfare" with a broader range of operational capabilities, and organizational, deployment, employment, and sustainment methods. EMW builds upon, rather than amends, the previous conceptual and doctrinal work that the Marine Corps has developed. Consequently, it embraces Operational Maneuver from



the Sea (OMFTS), Ship-to-Objective Maneuver (STOM), Sustained Operations Ashore (SOA), Other Expeditionary Operations (OEO), as well as the overarching transformational concept of Seabasing and other functional concepts. EMW preserves the MAGTF as the central organizational construct, while providing commanders guidance for improvement in the other integrating concepts of deployment, employment, and sustainment.

Operational Maneuver from the Sea


Operational Maneuver from the Sea applies the principles and philosophy of EMW to the sea space. In crafting OMFTS, the Marine Corps codified the many lessons of history regarding how command of the sea can create an operational advantage through a maneuver warfare approach. OMFTS focuses on the littoral region at the operational level of war. Operational maneuver is conducted with a reactive adversary in mind and is designed to place



the enemy in a dilemma, at positional disadvantage or vulnerable to surprise. The ability to strike from the sea at the time and place of our choosing compels the enemy to defend the length of his coast. The capability provided by OMFTS forces the enemy to disperse the force throughout the littoral region and renders him vulnerable to defeat in detail. If the enemy fails to dissipate his combat power to guard against our capability and remains concentrated, then naval forces can maneuver opportunistically through the gaps in his defenses to strike at critical infrastructure and vulnerabilities. OMFTS enables naval forces to redefine the battle space. By attacking from an unexpected or new direction, naval forces can have decisive impact on the enemy scheme of maneuver.

Ship-to-Objective Maneuver

Marine Corps forces have long provided a scalable, tailorable, and expeditionary combined-arms option, enabling joint commanders to deal with a wide range of contingencies. For decades, however, Marine power projection has included a deliberate buildup of combat power ashore. This buildup required the establishment of a force beachhead, with relatively fixed fire support, logistics, and command-and-control positions located ashore. Only after naval forces fought ashore and established a beachhead would the MAGTF begin to focus its combat power on the joint force's operational objective. A combination of naval initiatives in advanced mobility, fires, and sustainment capabilities, leveraging



substantially enhanced information connectivity, will enable future Marine forces to be employed in a dramatically different manner, making them an even more effective tool of national power.

STOM is a transformational tactical application of enduring naval capabilities for OMFTS that exploits each of the capabilities described Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare. Enabled by persistent, responsive, and dynamic Sea Bases, forward deployed in international waters, naval forces executing STOM will be able to project MAGTFs directly to critical operational objectives located deep inland, dislocating our adversaries both in space and in time. STOM includes combined arms penetration and exploitation operations from over the horizon, by both air and surface means, with forces moving rapidly to operational objectives without stopping to seize, defend, and build up beachheads or landing zones.

STOM provides the Navy-Marine Corps Team with an enhanced sea-based forcible entry capability, optimized to enable the introduction of follow-on Air Force, Army, and multinational forces. In combination with other joint forces, naval forces capable of operational maneuver and STOM can also provide the joint force commander with Operational Maneuver Elements, ideal for creating dilemmas for our adversary during sustained operations ashore. Because naval forces able to conduct STOM will be able to project power more swiftly than ever before, they will also be able to "kick down the door" that the enemy's defense presents, and preclude him from effectively integrating his anti-access defenses as crises threaten.



Seabasing

Seabasing is a national capability and the overarching transformational operating concept for projecting and sustaining naval power and selected joint forces, which assures joint access by leveraging the operational maneuver of distributed and networked forces operating globally from the sea. The concept unites our capabilities for projecting offensive power, defensive power, command and control, mobility and sustainment around the world. As detailed in the Navy-Marine Corps Concept Enhanced Networked Seabasing (ENS), Seabasing enables and integrates OMFTS and STOM by employing the sea base as a means to support naval fire and maneuver at sea, in the littorals, and beyond. This combination of operational and tactical combined-arms capability, which gives us the ability to attack laterally as well as in depth, confronts our adversary with an operational problem he cannot solve.

Future Sea Base

The sea base is a scalable aggregation of distributed and networked platforms that

provides for the assembly, equipping, support, and sustainment of offensive and defensive power-projection forces from the sea, without reliance on land bases within the Joint Operations Area (JOA). The platforms composing the Sea Base are configured and tailored based on operational requirements and may include elements of an Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG), Carrier Strike Group (CSG), Maritime Prepositioning Group (MPG), high-speed connectors, or other theater assets. The Sea Base will exploit the maneuver space provided by the sea to enable and conduct joint



operations at a time and place of our choosing. A number of qualitative improvements distinguish the future Sea Base from our current capabilities. As described in ENS, they include:

Integrated Naval Power Projection

Fully networked, forward-deployed naval forces and platforms will conduct integrated naval power projection. These forces will use the sea as a means of maneuver and enable a broad range of joint campaign operations. Seabased operations incorporate, integrate, protect, and sustain all aspects of multi-dimensional naval power projection, from space to the ocean floor, from blue water to the littorals and beyond—without dependence on land bases within the JOA.

Network-Enabled C4ISR

Under our Seabasing concept, naval expeditionary command and control (C2)—integrated into the joint C2 architecture—extends throughout the littorals, from seabed to space, and applies to forces operating at sea and from the sea. Command and controlsystems will support naval forces from the point of departure to their objectives and throughout subsequent operations. These C2 systems will facilitate coordinated actions by dispersed forces and assets and enable decision-making at the lowest level to increase operational tempo. The sea-based commandand-control system, in concert with the overarching FORCEnet concept, will also support the functions of a joint task force headquarters.

Rapid Force Closure

Another key tenet of sea basing is that forces will close to the JOA by multi-dimensional means, including self-deployment and strategic air, surface, and commercial assets. Reflecting the forward deployment of sustainable, immediately employable, combat-ready forces, the initial naval response to a crisis will likely consist of the ESG and CSG. When ESGs and CSGs combine with a Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF) Future Squadron, the Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB), surface action groups, and the Combat Logistics



Force, the resulting sea base will generate synergy among these elements through the integration of their communication, fire-support, and logistics capabilities.

Phased At-Sea Arrival and Assembly

As the MPF Squadron moves to the objective area, the transformational capability resident within MPF (Future) platforms enables phased arrival and assembly. The ability to move directly to the sea base assures the rapid deployment of MEB-sized forces and selected joint forces in as few as seven days, without the need for host nation facilities within the IOA. These forces will arrive at locations en route to the objective area via strategic lift and selfdeployment, then move directly to the sea base using intra-theater assets, such as high-speed vessels and tilt-rotor aircraft. Supported on their way by networked command-and-control systems, which feature advanced collaborative planning and rehearsal technologies, these forces will arrive in the objective area ready for immediate employment.

Selective Offload

Unlike current MPF Squadrons, prepositioning ships of the future sea base will be able to conduct a selective offload of specific equipment and supplies to tailor general-purpose forces for specific missions. Regardless of whether the mission is a logistics-intensive humanitarian operation or a large-scale ship-to-objective maneuver in a major contingency, selective offload will facilitate the employment of an optimized force package.

Persistence and Sustainment

The traditional naval qualities of persistence and sustainment—enhanced by advanced force-wide networks—underpin the staying power and flexibility of the sea base. Naval platforms can stay on-station, where they are needed, for extended periods of time. Regional support bases sustain the sea base via strategic logistics pipelines from the United States and elsewhere. The at-sea maneuverability of the sea base, coupled with advanced underway replenishment technologies and techniques, will ensure force readiness over time.



Reconstitution at Sea

Finally, reconstitution at sea enables the rapid reemployment of a fully capable naval force for subsequent operations. Once recovered at the sea base, onboard logistics capabilities will allow MAGTFs to replace, re-equip, resupply, and refurbish personnel and equipment in their constituent units. While being replenished, these forces can simultaneously be task-organized for new missions, and operationally repositioned and redirected toward new objectives in the area of operations. At-sea reconstitution

optimizes MAGTF employment as an Operational Maneuver Element by the JFC. seabasing will provide our nation with unprecedented versatility and flexibility to exploit the freedom of the high seas, relatively unconstrained by political and diplomatic restrictions, for rapid deployment and immediate employment. It will be a key to national success in this new international security environment, and to our ability to meet and defeat our adversaries in the 21st century.

Sustained Operations Ashore

When possible and advantageous, MAGTF commanders will exploit sea-based capabilities. When necessary or more efficient, they will utilize land-based operations, and consequently MAGTFs must retain the capability to sustain operations from land bases. Throughout this century, Marine forces have been called upon to operate alongside Army and allied forces in sustained joint campaigns. MAGTF participation in Sustained Operations Ashore (SOA) will be every bit as likely in the 21st century. However, the nature of such participation will be different. SOA envisions the MAGTF



remaining a general purpose force, but one capable of executing a series of precise, focused combat actions rather than primarily participating in continuous, methodical ground operations. By capitalizing on its unique sea-based character, the MAGTF not only remains the nation's premier forcible entry force, but establishes itself as the force of choice for decisive operations, as well. Versatility in basing options ensures that Marines will be capable of mounting sustainable operations in "any clime or place."

Other Expeditionary Operations

Other Expeditionary Operations is a draft operational concept that is intended to assist in visualizing how the Marine Corps will conduct Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW). While the two other operational concepts, Operational Maneuver from the Sea and Sustained Operations Ashore, focus on operational maneuver and long-term combined-arms combat operations above and on the ground, OEO describes the strategic environment in which MAGTFs will operate, as well as the breadth and increasing complexity of the missions and tasks they will perform, and the capabilities they will require when performing MOOTW. The basic tenets of EMW, the Corps' fundamental approach to warfighting, are as applicable to OEO as they are to the other operational concepts. The Corps' emphasis on speed and tempo, the importance of identifying and applying strength against enemy vulnerabilities, and the focus on supporting the commander's efforts in dynamic situations are valid across the range of military operations. OEO stresses the importance of dynamic decision-making under conditions of ambiguity, and the need to create and exploit opportunity.



Information Operations

Information Operations (IO) at all levels must be carefully planned and fully integrated. MAGTFs must be organized, trained, and equipped to conduct IO in support of a national or theater campaign and in direct support of combat operations. From the Marine Corps' perspective, IO is not a warfighting function in its own right; it is an integrating concept that facilitates the warfighting functions of command and control, fires, maneuver, logistics, intelligence, and force protection. It is not simply another arrow in the MAGTF commander's quiver, but is a broad-based integrative approach that makes the bow stronger. This distinction is key to our belief that IO does not, and will not, replace any of the timetested warfighting functions—rather, it will enable each of them. Thus, the focus of Marine Corps IO will be upon the information-oriented activities that will best support the tailored application of combat power and the joint force commander's needs. Information Operations, whether shaping the battlespace to deter conflict or enabling decisive maneuver, must be recognized as an essential and potentially dominant activity.